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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the causal relationship between military
expenditure and economic growth by using a balanced panel of
35 African countries spanning 1990 to 2015. It uses the more
recently developed bivariate heterogeneous panel causality, GMM
and SGMM estimation techniques. The country-by-country causal-
ity results reveal:(i) no causal relationship between military
expenditure and growth in seven countries; (ii) unidirectional
causality from military expenditure to growth in two countries;
(iii) unidirectional relationship from growth to military expenditure
in fourteen countries; and (iv) bidirectional relationship in twelve
countries. These findings imply: (i) that the seven African coun-
tries with no causality can pursue defence policy objectives inde-
pendently from growth policy objectives; (ii) in the fourteen
countries, the fact that growth causes military expenditure and
not vice versa implies that, defence decisions are not made in a
way as to relatively promote growth; (iii) two African countries
effectively use military expenditure for growth aims, hence mili-
tary expenditure causes growth; and (iv) the bidirectional causality
in the 12 countries implies that both growth and defence policy
objectives can be pursued together. The GMMs results show that
military expenditure has a significant negative impact on growth
in Africa.
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1. Introduction
The role of military expenditure (henceforth, MILEX) in economic growth has
attracted research interest for some time now. Although attention has focussed more
on other parts of the world (Desli, Gkoulgkoutsika, & Katrakilidis, 2017; Dolores
Gadea, Pardos, & Perez-Fornies, 2004; Dunne, Nikolaidou, & Vougas, 2001; Dunne &
Tian, 2016; Kollias, Naxakis, & Zarangas, 2004; Krtalic & Major, 2010) and less on
Africa.1 When the issue of military spending in Africa ought to be given much atten-
tion not only for the academic needs but more so because of the surge of internal
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arm conflicts and intra-regional terrorist activities. Most part of Africa has become
increasingly unstable due to violent socio-political unrest and internal and cross bor-
der terror activities. Some countries in Africa are either recent post conflict fragile
states or in an active arm struggle of some sort. There are currently African countries
in war or are experiencing post-war conflict and tension (for example in West Africa,
the countries include Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo.
In East Africa, the countries include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda,
among others).
MILEX has been on the significant rise globally and in Africa also. The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2015) shows that Africa’s MILEX
increased by 91 per cent from 2004 to 2014. Figure 1 represents Africa’s average
MILEX and real GDP (RGDP) from 1990 to 2015.
The possible motivation that could be behind increasingly military spending in
Africa may be from the threat of insurgency and rebel groups (such as Al Shabaab,
Seleka, M23, the White Army, anti-Balaka, Boko Haram, and the LRA, etc.), the rise
of piracy, internal and border wars, emerging regional arms races and the desire of
some authoritarian governments to secure their grip on power, etc. These insurgent
groups cause conflicts which plays out differently on African countries, thereby exhib-
iting internal and cross-border dimensions. They depend on illicit trade, banditry,
and international terrorist networks for funding and support. In some cases, the arms
acquisitions could merely be a function of general economic growth of African coun-
tries. There are 54 countries in Africa and they all have different military and growth
ambitions, objectives and policies. Africa’s military expenditure has been rising over
the last 10 years as it can be seen in figure one above. War and insecurity are some
of the major obstacles to development (Dunne, Smith, & Willenbockel, 2005). In the
absence of peace and tranquillity, undertaking productive investment and making
returns on investment in a legal economy has a minimal likelihood.
The relationship between the two variables have been widely debated among
researchers and yet without consensus. The positive impact of military expenditure
on economic growth is said to include: provision of peaceful environment for invest-
ment and production activities to domestic and foreign investors; engaging resources
particularly population in research and development activities; providing technical
Figure 1. A graphical representation of Africa’s average military expenditure and real GDP from
1990 to 2015. Source: Author’s computation, 2019.
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skills, educational training, etc (Ando, 2009; Benoit, 1978; Dunne, Nikolaidou, &
Smith, 2002). On the contrary, some scholars have proven evidence of a negative
impact of defence expenditure on the economy which can crowding-out private
investment and adverse balance of payment and capital (physical and human)
destruction (see Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2003; Dunne, Nikolaidou & Smith, 2002;
Hou, 2010; Kentor & Kick, 2008; Shahbaz, Afza, & Shabbir, 2013, among others).
There are also studies that reports that defence-growth nexus is negligible (see Huang
& Mintz, 1990; Mintz & Stevenson, 1995). From the empirical literature, there is no
specific prediction on the direction of causality between defence-growth nexus.
Therefore, in terms of causal relationship between defence-growth nexus, some stud-
ies have reported causality running from defence spending to economic growth (inter
alia: Dunne et al., 2002; Dunne et al., 2001; Dunne & Vougas, 1999; €Ozmucur, 1996;
Saba & Ngepah, 2018; Sezgin, 2000). Studies that finds causality running from
economic growth to military expenditure includes: Dritsakis (2004); Kalyoncu and
Yucel (2006); Gokmenoglu, Taspinar, and Sadeghieh (2015); Korhan and
Mohammadesmaeil (2015), among others. While others find evidence of bidirectional
relationship between military spending and economic growth (see Cuaresma &
Reitschuler, 2006; Joerding, 1986; Kollias, Mylonidis & Paleologou, 2007; Lee & Chen,
2007a,b). However, studies conducted by G€orkem and Is¸ık (2008), Hirnissa,
Habibullah, and Baharom (2009) finds no evidence of causality between defence-
growth nexus. Among these previous studies, none has exclusively focussed on Africa
as a region to examine the causality between the defence-growth nexus except the
one on South Africa by Dunne and Vougas (1999) which was country-specific.
According to Smith (1994) and Mintz and Stevenson (1995), theoretical and meth-
odological limitations are possible reasons for the failure to reach a consensus in the
literature. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the reported findings of empirical studies
has often been associated with the use of different samples, different theoretical and
econometric specification, and different time periods (Hou & Chen, 2014).
The rising trends of MILEX overtime alongside with economic growth triggers the
interest of this study to empirically investigate the causal MILEX-growth nexus in
Africa. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine two important questions.
First, what is the nature of causal relationship between MILEX and growth at Africa
level? Second, what is direction of causality between MILEX and growth at country-
by-country level? Smaldone (2006) in his review of Africa, considers military spend-
ing relationships to be heterogeneous, elusive and complex. Therefore, this study con-
tributes to the existing literature by taking into account the heterogeneous nature of
African countries in causality framework developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin
(2012). We used SIPRI’s2 new comprehensive post-cold war balanced panel data set
for the period 1990 to 2015 for thirty-five (35) African countries (Perlo-Freeman &
Sk€ons, 2016; Smith, 2017). We further utilise Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) estimation techniques. To the best of our knowledge, no study is yet to fill
this gap in the literature. Hence, this study. The causality results suggest an overall
two-way relationship between military expenditure and growth at Africa level with
significant country-by-country level differences. The SGMM results show that military
expenditure has a significant negative impact on growth in Africa.
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The rest of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly literature review.
Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and data sources for the study.
Section 4 presents the empirical findings. While Section 5 gives the conclusion and
policy implications.
2. Literature review
Under this section, we review relevant theoretical and empirical literature related to
our study.
2.1. Theoretical literature
Since MILEX comes with a developed finance and government fiscal policy, there is
need to provide a brief theoretical discussion on the finance-led growth and fiscal
policy-growth nexuses and how it relates to MILEX. The Wagner’s and the Keynesian
school of thought argued the possible direction of causal relationship that may exist
between government expenditure and economic growth, that is, whether government
expenditure is as a result of a growing economy or vice versa. In 1883, Wagner
argued (known as Wagner’s Law) that during the industrialisation process, as the per
capita income of a country increases, the share of the government expenditures
increases as well, implying that causality runs from economic growth to government
expenditure. However, the Keynesians postulates that public expenditure is a compo-
nent of fiscal policy and can be used as a policy instrument to promote growth.
Hence, the causal relationship runs from public expenditure to growth. It is import-
ant to also note that MILEX is a component of government expenditure among other
expenditures such as education, health, social and income security, administration
and general government. In other words, government expenditures can be classified
into two broad categories - defence and non-defence. Large body of literature have
provided studies on the different components of government expenditure and it
impact on growth; and finance-led growth relationship (inter alia: Abu-Bader &
Abu-Qarn, 2003; Ahmad, Ali, & Iram, 2011; Katircioglu, 2010, 2012; Sodeyfi &
Katircioglu, 2016; Soukhakian, 2007). For this study, we focused more on the
defence-growth nexus considering the objective of this study. Theoretically, there is
no consensus about the impact and causal relationship between MILEX and economic
growth. Since there is no agreed theory among economists, various schools of thought
have emerged to properly incorporate MILEX into economic growth (Dunne &
Coulomb, 2008). These include the Neoclassical, Keynesian, Institutional, Marxist
and international theories, which enables researchers to identify numerous channels
linking MILEX to economic growth and help theorise its potential effects. These dif-
ferent channels can then be grouped into three major categories: demand, supply
and security.
The first theoretical approach of neoclassical theory links military spending to eco-
nomic development through the supply side channel. This theory considers the state
as a rational actor that balances the security benefits and opportunity costs of MILEX
in order to maximise national interest. In contrast, the Keynesian and Institutional
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theories are associated with both demand and supply side effects. These two
approaches believe that the output is increased through a Keynesian multiplier effect
when the state as a proactive entity utilises state funds on MILEX (Dunne & Uye,
2010). Marxist theory is of the view that by investing in the defence sector, countries
delay the collapse of the capitalist mode of production thereby leading to capitalist
development by escaping from the fall in the rate of profit (Coulomb & Bellais,
2008). While military spending has an inherently negative effect on the economy in a
capitalist state that is often characterised as having over production and stagnation.
Military spending contributes towards aggregate demand without adding to aggregate
supply, thus allowing firms to reduce their surplus, sell the goods and realise profits
(Gottheil, 1986; Riddle, 1986). The last theory comes from the international relations
which says that in the absence of international cooperation to reduce political ten-
sions, higher military spending can be used by a country to ensure its own security
in the region.
2.2. Related empirical literature
Some empirical studies in literature have investigated the causal relationship between
MILEX and economic growth since the seminal work of Benoit (1973, 1978). Studies
from the empirical literature shows that there exist four different types of causal rela-
tionships between MILEX and economic growth: unidirectional causality from
MILEX to economic growth which means MILEX influence economic growth; unidir-
ectional causality from economic growth which means greater economic growth or
high level of income could determine military expenditure; bi-directional causality
between defence and growth; and no causal relationship. These causality relationships
have been widely discussed in both cross-sectional and individual countries’ studies
with the use of different estimation techniques. For example, Kollias (1997) tests the
Granger causality between growth rates in GDP and the share of MILEX in GDP for
Turkey from 1954 to1993. The study uses two dummy variables due to Cyprus crisis
in the mid-1970s. The conclusion of the study is that there is no causal relationship
between MILEX and growth rates in GDP. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) study
uses multivariate cointegration and variance decomposition techniques to investigate
the causal relationship between government expenditures and economic growth for
Egypt, Israel, and Syria. The sample includes the following countries for the specified
periods: Egypt (1975–1998), Israel (1967–1998), and Syria (1973–1998). The empirical
results for the bivariate system reveal a negative unidirectional causality running from
military burden to economic growth in the three countries. While civilian govern-
ment expenditure causes a positive economic growth in Israel and Egypt within a
tri-variate system. Kollias, Manolas, and Paleologou (2004) also employs the Granger
causality test incorporating cointegration technique to ascertain the causal relation-
ship between defence spending and growth in Cyprus for the period 1964–1999. The
study concludes by revealing a bidirectional causality between defence spending and
economic growth.
Lai, Huang, and Yang (2005) investigates the causality between defence spending
and economic growth for China and Taiwan for the period between 1953 and 2000.
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The study uses VAR model and a multivariate threshold model. The empirical results
of both models indicate that Chinese defence spending Granger causes economic
growth and there are bidirectional causal relationships between Taiwan’s defence
spending and economic growth. Furthermore, Chinese defence spending growth
Granger causes Taiwan’s defence spending growth (one-way causality). Kalyoncu and
Yucel (2006) study explores the effect of MILEX on growth for Turkey and Greece.
The study also explores the direction of causality between growth of gross national
product (GNP) and military expenditure. For the estimation technique, they use loga-
rithmic form unit root test and Engel-Granger cointegration test on an annual data
set that span between 1956 and 2003. The findings of the causality test show that
there exists a unidirectional causality from growth to defence spending for Turkey.
Lee and Chen (2007a,b) examines the long-run causality between defence spending
and growth in a multivariate model. The study uses a panel data for 27 OECD and
62 non-OECD countries for the period 1988–2003. Their empirical results show that
there is fairly a strong evidence to support the hypothesis of a long-run relationship
between GDP and military expenditure.
Pradhan (2010) investigates the relationship between defence spending, public debt
and economic growth in four Asian countries, namely China, India, Nepal and
Pakistan from 1988 to 2007. The results of the panel Granger causality test revealed
that there exists bidirectional causality between public debt and economic growth in
the cases of China and India; unidirectional causality running from defence spending
to economic growth in China and Nepal; unidirectional causality from public debt to
defence spending in India. Tiwari and Shahbaz (2013) reinvestigates the effect of
defence spending on economic growth using structural unit root tests and ARDL
bounds testing approach to cointegration. The Granger causality analysis result shows
bidirectional causal relationship between defence spending and economic growth as
probed by variance decomposition approach.
Pan, Chang, and Wolde-Rufael (2015) investigates the causal relationship between
per capita military spending and economic growth covering the period from 1988 to
2010 for 10 Middle Eastern countries. They use bootstrap panel causality test. The
findings show that there is causal relationship running from per capita military
spending to economic growth only in Turkey and Israel but found unidirectional
Granger causality running from economic growth to military spending for Egypt,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Israel and Syria. Phiri (2017) investigates the case study for South
Africa and confirms that initially, MILEX supports to country’s economic growth
while at the later stages its largely decreases. Kollias and Paleologou (2019) employs a
panel vector autoregression (PVAR) to investigate the nexus between MILEX, invest-
ment spending and growth rates with 65 countries covering the period 1971–2014.
Findings from the study show that differences between the three income groups were
unearthed by the empirical tests conducted. Zaman (2019) examines the nexus among
military spending, business regulatory and growth. The results confirm the bidirec-
tional causality between (i) income growth and military factors, and (ii)
military growth and business factors. While it further validates the (i) business
led MILEX, (ii) income led MILEX, and (iii) military led trade openness in a panel of
G-7 countries.
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Alptekin and Levine (2012) investigates the relationship between MILEX and
growth by using a meta fixed and random effects regression analysis for 32 empirical
studies with 169 estimates to find the combined overall effect of MILEX on growth.
Their results show that there exists a ‘genuine’ net effect of MILEX on growth. The
existing empirical literature tends to support the negative impact of MILEX on
growth. This is because a survey of 168 studies by Dunne and Tian (2013) finds that
increasing the sample size to include more recent studies provides an increasingly
stronger evidence of a negative effect of MILEX on growth. While in a more recent
survey, Churchill and Yew (2018) also examines the relationship between MILEX and
economic growth using a sample of 272 meta observations of studies drawn from 48
primary studies. Their study finds that existing studies indicate growth-retarding
effects of MILEX and that it is more pronounced in less developed countries than in
developed countries. From the econometric perspective, this current study contributes
to the existing literature by adopting a heterogeneous Granger panel causality test
suggested by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) which previous studies have failed to
use. This is mainly because, Africa countries are heterogeneous in terms of their
MILEX and socioeconomic condition. The causality test developed by Dumitrescu
and Hurlin (2012) is used because it allows meaningful results to be interpreted, des-
pite possible cross-sectional dependence.
3. Econometric methodology and data sources
This section gives a description of the methodology employed to achieve the objec-
tives of this study. The section is subdivided into estimation strategy, panel Granger
causality test, empirical model and dataset respectively.
3.1. Estimation strategy
This paper used the Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) (Phillipps and
Hansen, 1990) estimators and Dynamic Ordinary Least Square (DOLS) (Stock &
Watson, 1993) estimators to examine the panel long-run elasticity. We apply the het-
erogeneous panel causality test developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012)3 to inves-
tigate the direction of causality between our variables of interest (i.e., MILEX and
growth). We used this causality test because it takes into account the heterogeneous
nature of the panel data. The causality test approach requires the selection of an
appropriate lag4 length. Therefore, the need to determine the optimum lag length for
each country in the causality framework becomes a paramount issue. The three crite-
ria and results for the optimal lag length are presented in Table A2 of the appendix.
In this study, we used the AIC because it minimises maximum possible risk in finite
sample sizes. This study further estimated generalised method of moments (GMM)
and system generalised method of moments5 (SGMM). We establish the dynamic
relationship that exist between MILEX and growth in Africa through the estimation
process of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998) for GMMs. These dynamic models are employed to evaluate the distinct
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effect of the independent variables on growth while controlling for the potential bias
due to the endogeneity of the regressors.
3.2. Panel Granger causality tests
In this stage, we perform a panel causality test suggested by Dumitrescu and Hurlin
(2012). The Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel causality test is based on a bivariate model. The
causality equations are as follows:
Equation (1) test the causality running from MILEX to economic growth:
lnRGDPi, t ¼ ui, t þ
Xp
j¼1 b
ðjÞ
i lnRGDPi, tj þ
Xp
j¼1 k
ðjÞ
i lnMILEXi, tj þ l1i, t (1)
Equation (2) test the causality running from economic growth to MILEX:
lnMILEXi, t ¼ si, t þ
Xp
j¼1 b
ðjÞ
i lnMILEXi, tj þ
Xp
j¼1 k
ðjÞ
i lnRGDPi, tj þ l2i, t (2)
Where, b and k are the slope coefficients; i indicates each country under study
(i¼ 1,… , N); t indicates time period (t¼ 1, … , T); p is the number of lag length; s
and u are the intercepts; and l1i, t and l2i, t are the error terms. The findings from
the panel causality tests are sensitive to the lag length. In this study, the maximum
lag length is set to five. The heterogeneous panel causality test in this study was a
modified version of the causality test suggested by Granger (1969). Further descrip-
tion for the variables can be found in Table 1.
3.3. Empirical model
Following previous studies, the basic theoretical model used to estimate the impact of
MILEX on economic growth follows Dunne, Nikolaidou, et al. (2002) and Knight,
Loayza, and Villanueva (1996) models. Our estimated model also includes other
macroeconomic variables that determine growth. In examining the relationship
between MILEX and economic growth in Africa, we estimate our empirical model as:
RGDPit ¼ b0 þ b1RGDPit1 þ b2MILEXit þ b3HCit þ b4GFCFit
þ b5POPRit þ b6IMGDPit þ b7EXGDPit þ eit (3)
Where: b1 . . . b7 are the coefficient parameters; eit is the error term; i ¼
1, 2 . . .N; and t ¼ 1, 2 . . .T: The variables are in logarithm form. The description
for the variables can be found in Table 1 below.
4. Empirical results and discussion
In this section, we present the econometric results and discuss the key findings ema-
nating from the estimations of our variables of interest.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 3593
4.1. Panel FMOLS and DOLS test results
Table 2 reports the estimated long-run elasticities results. The FMOLS and DOLS
estimated models gave different results. As the size of our sample is small in both
dimensions of time and the number of countries, the DOLS results would not be
robust. This is because it reduces the number of degrees of freedom by including
leads and lags in the variables. The DOLS estimation method, however, allows us to
confirm the general trend established by the FMOLS method. The panel long-run
elasticity is 0.11 for MILEX in the growth model, which is statistically significant at
1 per cent level, and the effect is negative. This mean that 1 per cent increase in
MILEX reduces growth by 11 per cent in the long-run. This implies that in the long-
run, MILEX could be detrimental to growth in Africa. Therefore, policies that could
help mitigate this negative effect in the long-run should be carefully formulated and
implemented by African governments. While HC, GFCF, and EXGDP reveals a sig-
nificant long-run positive impact on growth.
4.2. Panel causality tests results
The aim of this section is to present the findings on the direction of causality
between military expenditure and economic growth in Africa. The results in Table 3
reveal a strong evidence of bidirectional (feedback) causality between MILEX and
economic growth regardless of the number of lags included in the model at Africa
level. The results in Table 3 shows that the null hypothesis of no causality is rejected
across all the models because the panel test statistics at 1 per cent levels of signifi-
cance are statistically significant. This implies that an increase (decrease) MILEX
causes or predicts corresponding decrease (increase) in the level’s economic growth
in Africa. Equally, an increase (decrease) in the level of economic growth causes or
predicts a decrease (increase) MILEX. These results reflect a significant dynamic
Table 1. Dataset.
Variables Indicator/Description Source
Dependent Variable
RGDP Real gross domestic product per capita (proxy for
economic growth). Data is in constant 2010 U.S.
dollars (GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$))
World Bank, 2015.
Independent variables
MILEX Military expenditure as a percentage share of GDP.
Data in constant price (2014) US$ (millions)
SIPRI, 2017
HC Human capital (enrolment in secondary general, both
sexes (number) as a proxy for human capital. Data
in millions)
World Bank, 2015.
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage share
GDP (proxy for investment or physical capital). The
data is in billion dollar, constant 2010 U.S. dollars.
World Bank, 2015.
POPR Population growth rate World Bank, 2015
IMGDP Imports of goods and services as a percentage share
of the GDP
World Bank, 2015.
EXGDP Exports of goods and services as a percentage share of
the GDP
World Bank, 2015.
Note: The paper considers a sample of 35 African countries (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the list of countries)
over the period 1990–2015. Our choice of the sample size is solely determined by the availability of data for the
main variables in some of the countries.
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feedback relationship that exist between the two variables. These results are consistent
with the findings of Lai et al. (2005), Kollias, Manolas, et al. (2004), Tiwari and
Shahbaz (2013) and Saba and Ngepah (2019).
For the country-by-country analysis, Table 4 shows that there is unidirectional
causality running from MILEX to growth in two African countries.6 This result is
consistent with the findings of Sezgin (2000) and Dunne et al. (2001, 2002). While in
the reverse direction, growth causes MILEX in 14 countries.7 This finding is in line
with the study of Kalyoncu and Yucel (2006), Gokmenoglu et al. (2015) and Korhan
and Mohammadesmaeil (2015). The null hypothesis of no Granger causality is
rejected for these countries in the opposite directions of causality. The individual
Wald statistics at 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance are statistically significant.
This means that an increase (decrease) in MILEX causes (predicts or lead to) decrease
(increase) in the levels of growth. While, an increase (decrease or fall) in the level of
growth does not cause decrease (increase) in MILEX in these two countries. This
means that for these countries to attain a significant level of growth, MILEX policies
need to be pursued and given some level of attention. Causality running from MILEX
to growth shows that growth policies could be partly dependent and integrated with
MILEX policies. In this case, policy failure in the defence sector could possibly affect
the level of economic growth of these two countries. The effective demand stimulative
Table 2. Cointegrating regression (FMOLS and DOLS long-run elasticities).
Dep. Variable: GDPPC DOLS Std. Error p-value FMOLS Std. Error p-value
MILEX 0.119 0.022 0.000 0.112 0.037 0.002
HC 0.298 0.025 0.000 0.316 0.034 0.000
GFCF 0.125 0.024 0.000 0.139 0.044 0.001
POPR 0.018 0.010 0.076 0.008 0.027 0.762
IMGDP 0.331 0.046 0.000 0.277 0.096 0.004
EXGDP 0.263 0.030 0.000 0.235 0.039 0.000
R-squared 0.979 0.999
Adj. R-squared 0.979 0.995
Note:  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05, and  p< 0.1 are significance level, respectively. Source: Author’s computa-
tions, 2019.
Table 3. Summary of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) Panel causality test.
Panel causality between military expenditure and economic growth
Lag
length (ki)
Panel test statistics
Wald test
statistics Z-statistics
Zbar tild
statistic
Nature of
direction
Panel
direction
1 7.489 27.146 22.696 Rgdp fi Milex Bidirectional Causality
1 2.051 4.396 3.392 Milex fiRgdp
2 8.395 37.832 14.892 Rgdp fi Milex Bidirectional Causality
2 3.212 7.169 2.411 Milex fiRgdp
3 11.192 59.358 14.671 Rgdp fi Milex Bidirectional Causality
3 6.505 25.394 5.898 Milex fiRgdp
4 14.478 87.663 15.181 Rgdp fi Milex Bidirectional Causality
4 9.277 44.147 7.241 Milex fiRgdp
5 18.390 125.253 15.997 Rgdp fi Milex Bidirectional Causality
5 11.278 58.723 6.982 Milex fiRgdp
Notes: Rejection of the null hypothesis of no causal relationship between military expenditure and economic
growth at least at the 10% level of significance of p-value.  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1. Milex!Rgdp denote
causality running from military expenditure to economic growth. Rgdp!Milex denote causality running from eco-
nomic growth to military expenditure. Source: Author’s computations, 2019.
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Table 4. Summary of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) Panel causality test.
Panel Causality between Military expenditure and Growth
Country
Optimal
Lag (ki)AIC
Individual Statistics
Wald test
statistic (Wi) P-Value (pi)
Nature
of Direction
Direction
of Causality
Algeria 1 2.240 0.135 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
0.045 0.832 Milex ! Rgdp
Angola 2 11.019 0.004 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
2.597 0.273 Milex ! Rgdp
Benin 1 3.767 0.052 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
0.476 0.490 Milex ! Rgdp
Botswana 5 19.373 0.002 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
6.150 0.292 Milex ! Rgdp
Burkina Faso 5 40.379 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
2.069 0.839 Milex ! Rgdp
Burundi 2 1.409 0.494 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
0.969 0.616 Milex ! Rgdp
Cameroon 4 26.875 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
9.586 0.048 Milex ! Rgdp
Chad 5 19.897 0.001 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
3.856 0.570 Milex ! Rgdp
Co^te d’Ivoire 5 29.915 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
14.651 0.012 Milex ! Rgdp
Egypt 5 14.647 0.012 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
15.107 0.009 Milex ! Rgdp
Ethiopia 5 7.338 0.197 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
36.022 0.000 Milex ! Rgdp
Gambia 4 36.052 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
18.663 0.000 Milex ! Rgdp
Ghana 5 74.661 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
18.828 0.002 Milex ! Rgdp
Kenya 1 45.310 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
0.642 0.423 Milex ! Rgdp
Lesotho 1 3.577 0.059 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
0.038 0.845 Milex ! Rgdp
Madagascar 3 3.069 0.381 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
0.393 0.942 Milex ! Rgdp
Malawi 2 13.056 0.002 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
1.327 0.515 Milex ! Rgdp
Mali 5 44.034 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
7.002 0.221 Milex ! Rgdp
Mauritania 2 0.466 0.792 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
13.011 0.002 Milex ! Rgdp
Mauritius 1 3.053 0.081 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
0.314 0.575 Milex ! Rgdp
Morocco 5 26.276 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
9.778 0.082 Milex ! Rgdp
Mozambique 2 7.131 0.028 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
15.828 0.000 Milex ! Rgdp
Nigeria 5 14.729 0.012 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
14.400 0.013 Milex ! Rgdp
Rwanda 4 10.875 0.028 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
50.845 0.000 Milex ! Rgdp
Senegal 1 12.645 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
1.931 0.165 Milex ! Rgdp
Seychelles 1 0.229 0.632 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
0.012 0.913 Milex ! Rgdp
Sierra Leone 2 0.312 0.856 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
0.453 0.797 Milex ! Rgdp
South Africa 3 8.888 0.030 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
4.661 0.198 Milex ! Rgdp
Sudan 3 7.974 0.047 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
(continued)
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effect channel from MILEX to the economy seems to be the case for these countries.
The reverse case holds for when causality runs from growth to MILEX in the 14
countries. The null hypothesis of no Granger causality is rejected for the 14 countries.
The individual Wald statistics at 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance are statistically
significant. This means that a rise (fall) in the level of growth causes (predicts) a fall
(rise) in MILEX. This implies that governments of these countries fund military/
defence activities from taxing production but with no positive returns on production.
This further implies that growth of the economy allows more resources to be allo-
cated to defence sector.
Bidirectional causality runs between MILEX and economic growth in 12 African
countries.8 This is consistent with previous investigations (Cuaresma & Reitschuler,
2006; Kollias et al. 2007; Lee & Chen, 2007a,b). This means that both MILEX and
economic growth causes each other. A rise (fall) in MILEX causes a corresponding
rise (fall) in the level of growth. For countries that falls under this category, the
results suggest that MILEX and economic growth policies are formulated and pursued
to complement each other. It also shows that they are dependent on each other, such
that, a policy shift in one may have an impact on the other.
Furthermore, there is no causality between military expenditure and economic
growth seven countries which means that the variables are independent of each
other in these countries. This is consistent with previous studies (see G€orkem &
Is¸ık, 2008; Hirnissa et al., 2009). The null hypothesis of no Granger causality is
accepted for seven African countries.9 The individual Wald statistics at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels of significance are not statistically significant. This means that an
increase (decrease) MILEX does not cause (predicts or lead to) a corresponding
decrease (increase) in the levels of growth. This implies that for these countries to
attain a significant level of growth, both MILEX and growth policies can be pursued
separately.
Table 4. Continued.
Panel Causality between Military expenditure and Growth
Country
Optimal
Lag (ki)AIC
Individual Statistics
Wald test
statistic (Wi) P-Value (pi)
Nature
of Direction
Direction
of Causality
6.467 0.091 Milex ! Rgdp
Swaziland 1 3.007 0.083 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
0.376 0.539 Milex ! Rgdp
Togo 2 9.666 0.008 Rgdp ! Milex Unidirectional
0.034 0.983 Milex ! Rgdp
Tunisia 1 0.906 0.341 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
0.373 0.542 Milex ! Rgdp
Uganda 4 40.386 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
11.342 0.023 Milex ! Rgdp
Zambia 5 25.062 0.000 Rgdp ! Milex Bidirectional
40.369 0.000 Milex ! Rgdp
Zimbabwe 1 1.810 0.179 Rgdp ! Milex No causality
1.571 0.210 Milex ! Rgdp
Notes: Rejection of the null hypothesis of no causal relationship between military expenditure and economic
growth at least at the 10% level of significance of p-value.  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1. Milex ! Rgdp
denote causality running from military expenditure to economic growth. Rgdp ! Milex denote causality running
from economic growth to military expenditure. Source: Author’s computations, 2019.
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4.3. Two-Step GMM and SGMM results
We proceeded with the estimations of two-step GMM and SGMM in order to
overcome the problem of possible endogeneity issues in our model. Table 5 presents
the results of the diagnostic tests for the models in order to establish the validity of
the instruments for the estimated models. The dynamic panel models (GMM
and SGMM) do not assume normality and allow for heteroscedasticity, which can be
controlled through valid instrumentation (Baltagi, 2008). Columns 1 and 2
(see Sargan p-values), the Sargan Test for Over-identifying Restrictions confirmed the
validity for two-step GMM and SGMM results for Africa. This implies that all our
models are rightly specified and sufficient for policy-making. The models also passed
the Arellano-Bond Test for Zero Autocorrelation. We estimated the GMM and
SGMM to control for country fixed effect (heterogeneity), endogeneity, and mitigated
the omitted variable bias problem. This study relied on the SGMM results because it
takes into account these problems. In Column 2 of Table 5, the empirical results of
the Two-step SGMM show that the lag of economic growth, MILEX, HC, GFCF,
POPR, IMGDP and EXGDP are statistically significant at least at 1 per cent signifi-
cance level. But HC is statistically insignificant to economic growth in Africa, at least
at 10 per cent significance level. The overall joint significance of SGMM estimation,
which is tested through the Wald chi-square, is 6469.53 with a probability value of
0.000. This implies that the lag of economic growth, and explanatory variables are
jointly significant to economic growth in Africa. The lagged level value of real GDP
per capita (RGDP) was negative and significant for Africa, which is known as
Table 5. Two-step GMM and SGMM results.
(1) (2)
Variables GMM SGMM
RGDP (1) 0.890 0.958
(0.021) (0.018)
MILEX 0.040 0.038
(0.003) (0.003)
HC 0.057 0.017
(0.011) (0.012)
GFCF 0.028 0.035
(0.003) (0.003)
POPR 0.003 0.006
(0.001) (0.001)
IMGDP 0.055 0.039
(0.007) (0.008)
EXGDP 0.045 0.037
(0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.408 0.026
(0.127) (0.116)
Observations 838 874
Number of Instruments 307 331
Wald v2 557.62 6469.53
Diagnostic test Results
Sargan test 31.442 31.531
p-value (1.000) (1.000)
AR (2) 0.2709 0.151
p-value (0.786) (0.880)
Notes:  p< 0.01,  p< 0.05,  p< 0.1. Standard errors in Parentheses. GMM: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data
estimation. SGMM: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system dynamic panel-data estimation. Source: Author’s computa-
tions, 2019.
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conditional convergence. As expected, this is the standard result in the empirical
growth literature. For our variable of interest, the GMM and SGMM results in col-
umn 1 and 2 show that MILEX has a significant negative effect on economic growth
at Africa level. The MILEX result is consistent with Dunne et al. (2002), Abu-Bader
and Abu-Qarn (2003), Kentor and Kick (2008), Shahbaz et al. (2013) and Dunne and
Tian (2013) findings.
The 0.04 per cent negative impact of MILEX on growth implies that MILEX is
detrimental to growth in Africa. This further shows that MILEX is not the best
means to attain growth and development in Africa. This is because it has the ten-
dencies of diverting resources from other productive sectors of the economy such
as education, infrastructure or health etc. Mylonidis (2008) explain the fact that
MILEX could crowding out public and private investment; contribute to adverse
balance of payment within arms importing countries (of which is the case for
most African countries); inefficient bureaucracies are just some of the possible
opportunity costs associated with the negative impact of MILEX. Because resources
are usually allocated to the defence sector in Africa, this could have probably con-
tributed to the insignificant impact of human capital on growth given the oppor-
tunity cost associated with MILEX. The reason is that the resource that could
have gone to the educational sector for human capital development is been
diverted to the defence sector. The SGMM results of this study tend toward the
neoclassical crowding-out effect of MILEX. The traditional growth variables such
as investment (GFCF), population growth rate (POPR) are statistically significant
and they have the expected signs, a finding that is in line with Mankiw, Romer,
and Weil (1992)’s predictions. The investment variable is positive and significant,
which implies that the higher the investment, the richer African countries become.
The variable population growth rate (POPR) is negative and significant, which
implies that higher rates of population growth have a negative impact on African
countries economy.
Africa is a developing region when compared to the western world (i.e., developed
region). Developed countries often have the capacity to allocate resources of their
national budget to MILEX. While most less developed countries like African countries
suffers from extreme levels of poverty and governments that continue to allocate a
substantial portion of their resources to MILEX. Comparing the results of this study
with the one conducted by Dunne and Tian (2015). We conclude that MILEX in the
developing region like Africa does not promote growth when compared to the devel-
oped regions. Factors that are responsible for underdeveloped could possibly be the
reason behind these differences.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
The MILEX impact on economic growth by African governments remain a big ques-
tion that is yet to be answered in the empirical literature. Therefore, in this paper we
contribute to the empirical literature by examining the relationship between MILEX
and economic growth by using a causality and dynamic panel model approaches. We
used a balanced panel of 35 African countries spanning 1990 to 2015. The estimation
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 3599
techniques used for this study include: cointegrating regression tests (FMOLS and
DOLS long-run elasticities); heterogeneous panel Granger causality test suggested by
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012); Two-step GMM and SGMM. The results from the
FMOLS and DOLS long-run elasticities reveals that MILEX have a negative long-run
impact on growth. From the heterogeneous panel causality test, the overall results of
the panel model show that there is a bidirectional causality between MILEX and eco-
nomic growth in Africa. However, country-by-country results reveal that: (1) no
causal relationship for seven countries; (2) unidirectional causality from MILEX to
growth in two countries; (4) unidirectional causality from growth to MILEX in four-
teen countries; and (5) bidirectional causality between MILEX and growth in twelve
countries. The results of this study enable us to conclude that the defence sector plays
an important role in the economic growth of some African countries. And most espe-
cially, it could be among other factors that contribute towards the growth of some
countries considering the channels by which it could impact on the economy.
Furthermore, the SGMM results show that MILEX has a significant negative impact
on Africa’s growth.
Based on our empirical findings, we suggest four main policy implications. Firstly,
the African countries with no causality can purse defence policy objectives independ-
ently from economic growth policy objectives. Secondly, in countries where unidirec-
tional causality runs from military expenditure to economic growth, defence policy
objective processes should be made and pursued seriously. Since the economic growth
process partly depend on the defence sector. Thirdly, in countries where unidirec-
tional causality runs from economic growth to military expenditure, military expend-
iture objectives and policies should be made and pursued based on the level of
growth of the economy. Since the defence sector depend partly on the level of
growth. Fourthly, the bidirectional causal relationship between military expenditure
and economic growth also suggests a degree of interdependence between military
expenditure policy objectives and economic growth policy objectives. Therefore, in
such countries the implementation of economic growth policies should not be given
more priority over the defence sector policies given the fragility of African countries
insecurity. For this reason, an integration and creation of synergy should exist
between defence and growth policies decisions when pursuing both defence and eco-
nomic growth objectives across African countries. The results further suggest that the
causal relationship between military expenditure and economic growth cannot be
generalised across African countries. The reason is because the actual relationship
may vary from one country to another due to the sample period, differences in the
defence and growth policies, and the type of government in each of these countries.
The negative impact of MILEX on growth suggest that policy makers should try as
much as possible not to ultimately use MILEX to attain economic growth and devel-
opment given the fact that Africa is still economically a developing region. But rather
look forward to channelling these resources to other productive sectors such as edu-
cation, healthcare, etc. This does not mean that African governments should com-
pletely leave out or exclude MILEX from their budget given the fact that it is needed
to maintain a relative level of security (internal and external) necessary for economic
and investment activities.
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The empirical analysis on the relationship between MILEX and growth is a conten-
tious theme that has over the years attracted attention and debate, and yet without
consensus (Dunne & Tian, 2013, 2016). Therefore, future empirical studies may adopt
the methodological approach of using the heterogeneous panel causality test devel-
oped by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) to investigate the relationship between
MILEX and other macroeconomic variables such as investment, debts burden,
unemployment etc. Our study focuses on Africa and uses a panel data for MILEX
and growth covering the period from 1990 to 2015. Future investigations using more
extensive data by employing both linear and nonlinear tests would enhance the
understanding between defence-growth causality nexus for Africa.
Notes
1. Apart from Dunne and Vougas (1999), Dunne (2010) and Aikaeli and Mlamka (2010) we
could hardly find other papers on Africa.
2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
3. Interested readers are referred to Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) methodological
framework for more details.
4. It is important to make a little distinction between lag length for VAR (or VECM) and lag
length for unit root test. The former is estimated so as to eliminate autocorrelation in the
error term of the entire model while the latter is selected so as to eliminate
autocorrelation in variable-specific error terms.
5. Interested readers are referred to Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover, (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) for more details.
6. These countries include Ethiopia and Mauritania.
7. These countries include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland and Togo.
8. These countries include Cameroon, Co^te d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia.
9. These countries include Algeria, Burundi, Madagascar, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia
and Zimbabwe.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of selected African countries.
Countries
Algeria Burundi Ethiopia Madagascar Morocco Seychelles Togo
Angola Cameroon Gambia Malawi Mozambique Sierra Leone Tunisia
Benin Chad Ghana Mali Nigeria South Africa Uganda
Botswana Co^te d’Ivoire Kenya Mauritania Rwanda Sudan Zambia
Burkina Faso Egypt Lesotho Mauritius Senegal Swaziland Zimbabwe
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Table A2. Optimum lag length selection.
Country
Selection of lag order for each country
AIC HQIC SBIC
Algeria 1 1 1
Angola 2 2 2
Benin 1 1 1
Botswana 5 5 1
Burkina Faso 5 5 3
Burundi 2 2 2
Cameroon 4 4 1
Chad 5 5 1
Co^te d’Ivoire 5 5 2
Egypt 5 5 5
Ethiopia 5 5 2
Gambia 4 4 4
Ghana 5 5 5
Kenya 1 1 1
Lesotho 1 1 1
Madagascar 3 3 1
Malawi 2 2 2
Mali 5 5 5
Mauritania 2 2 1
Mauritius 1 1 1
Morocco 5 5 2
Mozambique 2 2 2
Nigeria 5 1 1
Rwanda 4 4 1
Senegal 1 1 1
Seychelles 1 1 1
Sierra Leone 2 2 2
South Africa 3 2 2
Sudan 3 2 1
Swaziland 1 1 1
Togo 2 2 1
Tunisia 1 1 1
Uganda 4 4 1
Zambia 5 5 5
Zimbabwe 1 1 1
Notes: The selection of lag order is based on Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information cri-
terion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). The maximum lag is set to five. Source:
Author’s computations, 2019.
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